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Abstract  
What factors make countries vulnerable to banking crises?  Particularly, how 
do reforms in regulation affect the likelihood of banking crises’ onset?  
Several recent articles describe the “anatomy” of banking crises.  However, 
the economic indicators that precede these crises do not necessarily imply 
causality.  Furthermore, the broader literature on financial crises finds a set 
of institutional causal factors to be important for financial crises, but these 
factors likely do not apply to banking crises.  In the last 20 years banking 
crises have affected countries that should be impervious to them, while 
countries at risk have been surprisingly resilient.  I argue that differences in 
vulnerability to banking crises are a result of the asymmetry between 
financial market evolution and regulation update.  Although regulation tends 
to follow the developments in the financial market everywhere, lags in 
regulation have different effects at different levels of financial market 
liberalization.  This paper analyzes the interactions between financial market 
liberalization and regulation update on a world-wide sample between 1973 
and 2006. 
 
Resumen 
¿Qué factores aumentan la vulnerabilidad de los países a crisis bancarias?  
En particular, ¿de qué modo reformas a la regulación afecta a la 
probabilidad del inicio de crisis bancarias?  Varios artículos recientes 
describen la “anatomía” de las crisis bancarias.  Sin embargo, el 
comportamiento de indicadores económicos que precede a estas crisis no 
implica necesariamente causalidad.  Más aún, la literatura más amplia sobre 
crisis financieras identifica un conjunto de factores institucionales en el 
origen de crisis financieras, pero dichos factores no parecen aplicarse al 
caso de las crisis bancarias.  En los últimos veinte años, crisis bancarias han 
sacudido a países que deberían haber sido capaces de resistirlas, en tanto 
países en riesgo han sido sorprendentemente resistentes a ellas.  En este 
trabajo se arguye que diferencias en la vulnerabilidad a crisis bancarias es 
el resultado de la asimetría entre la evolución del mercado financiero y la 
actualización de la regulación.  Aún cuando la regulación tiende a seguir los 
desarrollos del mercado financiero en casi todos los casos, retrasos en la 
regulación (“regulatory lags”) tienen distintos efectos a diferentes niveles de 
liberalización del mercado financiero.  Este trabajo analiza las interacciones 
entre liberalización del mercado financiero y actualización de la regulación 
en una muestra global entre 1973 y 2006. 
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Introduction 
What factors make countries vulnerable to banking crises?  Particularly, how 
do reforms in regulation affect the likelihood of banking crises’ onset?  A 
recent literature describes the “anatomy of the crises” by identifying the 
behavior of economic indicators that precedes banking crises.  However, the 
identification of the behavior of economic indicators observed before a 
banking crisis does not imply a causal relationship, or the identification of 
necessary and sufficient conditions.  The literature shows that lack of 
democracy, political or institutional instability, and low development of 
financial markets are associated with an increased vulnerability to banking 
crises.  However, especially since 1990, divergences between the literature’s 
expectations and reality seem puzzling: banking crises have affected countries 
that should be less vulnerable to them.  Furthermore, some countries that 
should have suffered banking crises have surprisingly avoided them.   
This paper focuses on political choices that affect countries’ vulnerability 
to banking crises.  In particular, I explore the effect of lags in regulation 
update on the likelihood of experiencing banking crises.  I argue that 
differential vulnerability to banking crises is a result of the asymmetry 
between financial markets’ evolution and regulation updating.  Although 
regulation tends to follow the developments in the financial market, as time 
elapses since a banking regulation reform, there is a higher likelihood of new 
banking sector developments that can increase financial instability.  For 
example, banks can develop products not foreseen at the time of the 
regulation, or even find loopholes in the legislation and take advantage of 
them.  Lags in regulation update, however, may not have the same effect in 
different environments.  Empirical evidence presented in this paper suggests 
that regulatory lags are positively associated with banking crisis onset, but 
that this relationship is conditional on the level of financial liberalization. 
This paper proceeds as follows: I first examine the definition of banking 
crisis, and the “anatomy” of banking crises.  I review the literature on 
economic and behavioral roots of banking crises and then present a theory of 
the relationship between regulatory lags and vulnerability to banking crises.  
In section 3, I present an empirical test for two hypotheses derived from the 
theory.  Section 4 concludes. 
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Banking crises 
Definition 
 
This paper focuses on systemic banking crises,1 the collective failure of banks 
of a severe magnitude.  Banking crises have been defined as either panics or 
severe waves of bank failures (Calomiris 2010:4).  According to Calomiris and 
Gorton (1991:112), a banking panic occurs “when bank debt holders at all or 
many banks in the banking system suddenly demand that banks convert their 
debt claims into cash […] to such an extent that the banks suspend 
convertibility of their debt into cash or, in the case of the United States, act 
collectively to avoid suspension of convertibility by issuing clearing-house loan 
certificates.”2  Severe waves of bank failures are “those resulting in 
aggregate negative net worth of failed banks in excess of 1 per cent of GDP” 
(Calomiris 2010:4).  
This definition is narrower than many others that include the 
government´s response as an alternative way to identify a systemic banking 
crisis (Caprio Jr. and Honohan 2008; Caprio Jr. and Klingebiel 1999; 
Duttagupta and Cashin 2008; Kaminsky and Reinhart 1999), or one of the 
crisis’s necessary characteristics (Laeven and Valencia 2008, 2010).  For 
example, Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) use the government’s response as an 
alternative form of identifying banking crises.  According to them, banking 
crises are often defined by two events: “(1) bank runs that lead to the 
closure, merging, or takeover by the public sector of one or more financial 
institutions,” or, in the absence of runs, (2) “the closure, merging, takeover, 
or large-scale government assistance of an important financial institution (or 
group of institutions) that marks the start of a string of similar outcomes for 
other financial institutions” (Kaminsky and Reinhart 1999:476).  Similarly, 
Caprio and Honohan define systemic banking crisis as “the widespread 
insolvency of banks leading to closures, mergers, takeovers, or injections of 
government resources” (Caprio Jr. and Honohan 2008:2).  Duttagupta and 
Cashin define banking crisis as “an episode involving banking sector problems 
that resulted in: exhaustion of much of the capital and closure, merger, large-
scale nationalization of banks; or extensive bank runs; or large scale liquidity 
support by the central bank to avoid a run on deposits” (Duttagupta and 
Cashin 2008:9). 
This paper follows Laeven and Valencia’s (2008, 2010) definition of 
banking crisis.  They define a systemic banking crisis when two conditions are 
                                                 
1 For simplicity, the text refers to “banking crises.”  Banking crises and systemic banking crises are considered 
synonymous. 
2 Kindleberger ([1989] 2005) stresses the role of speculation at the root of banking panics.  On the difference 
between banking panics and bank runs, see Calomiris and Gorton (1991:112). 
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met: not only there have to be (1) “significant signs of financial distress in the 
banking system (as indicated by significant bank runs, losses in the banking 
system, and bank liquidations),” but there must also be (2) “significant 
banking policy intervention measures in response to significant losses in the 
banking system” (Laeven and Valencia 2010:6).  Although including 
government intervention in the definition of crisis can be problematic for the 
study of responses to banking crises (Rosas 2006), its inclusion implies a higher 
threshold for considering a crisis to be systemic.3 
 
Anatomy of crises, economic fundamentals, and banking crises 
Economic explanations have identified, with more or less precision, the 
behavior of variables that precedes banking crises, describing what they call 
the “anatomy of the crises” (Duttagupta and Cashin 2008; Kaminsky and 
Reinhart 1999).  However, the identification of the sequence observed before 
a banking crisis does not imply a causal relationship, or the identification of 
necessary and sufficient conditions. For example, Goldstein and Turner (1996) 
point to different indicators of domestic and foreign macroeconomic 
volatility, lending booms, increasing bank liabilities with large 
maturity/currency mismatches; inadequate preparation for financial 
liberalization; heavy government involvement and loose controls on 
connected lending; weaknesses in the accounting, disclosure and legal 
framework; and exchange rate regimes.  However, they do not offer a 
multivariate test of the effect of these indicators on banking crisis onset. 
Beyond the description of the anatomy of banking crises, there is evidence 
regarding the impact of economic fundamentals on the country’s vulnerability 
to banking crises (Calomiris and Gorton 1991; Calomiris and Mason 2003).  One 
of the main factors that precede a banking crisis is recession (Goldstein and 
Turner 1996:6; Kaminsky and Reinhart 1999; Repullo and Suarez 2008).4  For 
example, Kaminsky and Reinhart suggest that crises tend to follow recessions, 
that are usually a result of “a prolonged boom in economic activity that was 
fueled by credit, capital inflows, and accompanied by an overvalued 
currency” (1999:473). 
The literature also links inflation with banking crises.  Some scholars argue 
that high inflation precedes banking crises (Angkinand et al. 2010; Boyd and 
Champ 2003; Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache 1999, 2005; Duttagupta and 
Cashin 2008).  High inflation proxies high macroeconomic instability 
(Duttagupta and Cashin 2008) or indicates an adverse selection problem, 
because highly inflationary environments could attract borrowers of relatively 
                                                 
3 For a justification for including the government’s judgment to characterize a banking crisis as systemic, see 
Ergungor and Thomson (2005:2). 
4 Recessions are argued to precede not only banking crises, but also other kinds of financial crises (Mishkin 1995). 
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low quality (Boyd and Champ 2003).  However, other studies find inflation to 
have an insignificant impact on crisis onset (Beck et al. 2003; Demirguc-Kunt 
and Detragiache 2002).5 This insignificance is attributed to a non-linear 
relationship (Duttagupta and Cashin 2008).  Finally, others argue that inflation 
rate volatility is important because it makes assessing credit risk hard 
(Goldstein and Turner 1996:11).   
Exchange rate regimes and currency crises are also associated with 
banking crises.  Regarding exchange rate regimes, Goldstein and Turner (1996) 
argue that the exchange rate regime can affect exposure to speculative 
attacks.  In particular, pegs can increase “the fragility of the banking system 
to external adverse shocks” (Goldstein and Turner 1996:31).  In a similar vein, 
Gavin and Hausmann suggests that “some degree of exchange-rate flexibility” 
might prevent shocks to spur banking crises (1996:3).  Others suggest that 
fixed exchange rates reduce the likelihood of banking crises because a 
constrained monetary policy may be less likely to bailout banks (Domaç and 
Martinez Peria 2003; Eichengreen and Rose 1998), but this only happens when 
the peg is credible (Miller 2009).  Finally, others find no particular 
relationship between exchange rate regimes and banking crises (Eichengreen 
and Arteta 2001:30). 
There are contrasting arguments linking currency and banking crises.  
First, Mishkin argues that currency crises can lead to banking crises in 
developing countries because banks tend to raise funds with liabilities 
denominated in foreign currencies.  Therefore, devaluations can affect the 
bank balance and increase the odds of bank failures or panics (Mishkin 
1995:24).  Second, Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) posit the opposite causal 
direction and find that currency crises tend to follow banking crises.  
However, their paper does not present clear causal mechanisms linking both 
types of crises, and their sample could be driving this result.6  Finally, 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) mention other studies that argue that currency 
and banking crises have the same roots (Goldfajn and Valdés 1997; McKinnon 
and Pill 1996).  
In addition to weak fundamentals, economic volatility is also associated 
with vulnerability to crises.  Goldstein and Turner suggest that volatility can 
alter the ratio of the values of bank assets and their liabilities (1996:9).  The 
literature points out two main sources of volatility: large fluctuations in 
foreign trade (Caprio Jr. and Klingebiel 1996; Kaminsky and Reinhart 1999), 
and in real interest rates (Goldstein and Turner 1996:10). 
 
                                                 
5 In Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2002), once real interest rate is added to the 1999 paper’s model (and on a 
larger sample), inflation loses statistical significance.  The authors attribute this to the high correlation between 
inflation and real interest rate.  However, that problem disappears when using inflation’s natural log. 
6 Their sample includes 20 countries between 1970 and 1995, and covers 26 banking crises and 76 currency crises 
(Kaminsky and Reinhart 1999:476). 
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Whose behavior? 
Something is missing when attributing banking crises to the behavior of 
economic variables.  Linking banking crisis onset to drops in the economic 
activity or to currency crises leaves economic actors and the governments 
almost as mere spectators of economic dynamics.  A few explanations focus 
on the depositors’ behavior.  According to these works, depositors have a 
distinct impact on banking crises, even independently from changes in the 
real economy.  This argument reaches the extreme of presenting banking 
crises as self-fulfilling prophesies (Bryant 1980; Diamond and Dybvig 1983).  In 
this line, bank runs are explained as a coordination problem (Carlsson and van 
Damme 1993), or problems of information (Chang 2007; Chari and 
Jagannathan 1988). 
On the opposite side, many authors stress government’s decisions.  In 
particular, many identify liberalization as the root of banking crises (Caprio 
Jr. and Klingebiel 1996; Ergungor and Thomson 2005:3; Kaminsky and Reinhart 
1999).  Liberalization (and/or access to financial markets) facilitates access to 
financing, and potentially leads to financial bubbles (Kaminsky and Reinhart 
1999:474).  However, other authors argue liberalization could have the 
opposite effect,7 leading to more financial stability and economic growth.  
Angkinand et al. (2010) find an inverted U-shaped relationship between 
liberalization and the likelihood of crisis, conditional on the strength of 
capital regulation and supervision.  At some levels, liberalization is associated 
with better governance, risk management, and credit allocation in a 
liberalized system.  Their evidence indicates that “the level of liberalization 
beyond which further liberalization reduces the likelihood of banking crisis is 
relatively low in emerging market countries” (Angkinand et al. 2010:286).  
What is still not clear is what political decisions affect an economy’s 
vulnerability to crises.  In particular, what (and how) do political decisions 
affect the incentive structure for banking market actors?  This paper does not 
intend to explain the behavior of depositors, but to explore the effect of 
political decisions and their timing on a country’s vulnerability to banking 
crises. 
 
Regulatory lags and vulnerability to banking crises 
In early works, there was a concern regarding the impact of non-economic 
factors on the likelihood of crisis onset.  For example, Calomiris and Gorton 
                                                 
7 Angkinand et al. wonder whether the connection between liberalization and banking crises’ onset “simply captures 
a truism because some degree of liberalization is probably required for losses in the banking system to be 
manifested as a banking crisis. A highly repressed banking system may perform very poorly and still survive based on 
different forms of more or less overt state support” (Angkinand et al. 2010:264). 
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conclude that “banking panics are not inherent in banking contracts — 
institutional structure matters” (1991:110). 
I argue that differential vulnerability to banking crises is a result of the 
asymmetry between financial market evolution and regulation update.  My 
explanation is framed in Kane’s regulatory dialectic (Kane 1977), a concept 
that focuses on the cyclical interactions between political institutions and 
market actors in regulated markets.  As Kane explains, “it treats political 
processes of regulation and economic processes of regulatee avoidance as 
opposing forces that […] adapt continually to each other. This alternating 
adaptation evolves as a series of lagged responses, with regulators and 
regulatees seeking to maximize their own objectives, conditional on how they 
perceive the opposing party to behave” (Kane 1981:355).  
Bearing those dynamics in mind, I define regulatory lag as the time 
elapsed since the last regulation reform (in this case, the last prudential 
reform).  In most cases, regulation follows developments in the regulated 
area.8  However, there is a wide variance in the pace at which countries 
update their banking regulation (i.e., in the regulatory lags).  I posit that 
longer regulatory lags give the banking sector more opportunities to find ways 
to avoid constraints and to exploit the regulation in order to engage in more 
profitable operations.  This is consistent with Ergungor and Thomson’s view, 
suggesting that financial systems’ vulnerability to crises results from “the 
underlying incentives faced by banks, bank regulators, and other financial 
market participants” (2005:3).  Not only regulation, but also regulatory lags 
directly affect the incentives for banks. 
Adapting to (and sometimes, finding loopholes in) the regulation takes 
time.  Therefore, the development of risky activities should not happen right 
after a new regulation is passed.  Furthermore, it is likely that new legislation 
is better tailored to the financial market’s needs than older one.  It is the 
development of risky activities not foreseen by the legislation what increases 
the country’s vulnerability to banking crises.  This suggests the following 
hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1:  The longer the time elapsed since the last banking 
regulation reform, the more vulnerable the country is to banking crises. 
 
This hypothesis contradicts some literature that suggests that elapsed time 
should actually be helpful to prevent banks’ risky behavior.  Longer lags would 
provide regulators with the opportunity to learn the rules and to how 
effectively implement them.  For example, Noy argues that “since supervisors 
are … unfamiliar with the new ‘rules’, their effectiveness decreases 
(Dewatripont and Tirole 1993; Martinez Peria and Schmukler 2001; Nier and 
                                                 
8 The exception includes the cases where regulation is a product of diffusion, learning or some form of coercion 
(for example, conditions imposed in an agreement signed by the country). 
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Baumann 2006).  This effect [should] be stronger the weaker is the underlying 
supervisory regime” (Noy 2004:342). 
Although regulation tends to follow the developments in the financial 
market, and I argue lags are positively associated with banking crisis 
vulnerability, regulatory lags may have different effects depending on the 
financial market characteristics.  In particular, I argue that regulatory lags 
should have different effects at different levels of financial market 
liberalization.  The level of liberalization should matter because liberalization 
affects both available profit opportunities (and therefore, the incentives for 
banks to engage in risky behavior), and the structure of the financial market.  
These two circumstances also suggest that regulatory lags should have a 
stronger impact in less liberalized markets for the following reasons.9  
Regarding profit opportunities, when the banking sector is highly 
regulated, new opportunities for profit are usually limited.  This creates 
incentives to find ways to avoid the regulation’s constraints – especially when 
regulations impose low ceilings for profit.  Regulatory lags should have a 
stronger impact in this environment characterized by regulation avoidance, 
and should make the country more vulnerable to crises.  On the contrary, 
when the banking sector is highly deregulated, regulatory lags should have a 
minimal impact on banking crisis vulnerability.   
Regarding the structure of the market, a more liberalized financial market 
allows the participation of more banks in the system.  Although liberalization-
spurred competition among banks could encourage banks to take more risks, 
cross-national bank-level evidence shows higher levels of market discipline in 
more liberalized markets (e.g., Flannery 1998; Martinez Peria and Schmukler 
2001; Nier and Baumann 2006).  Therefore, at higher levels of liberalization, 
when competition among banks is strong, market discipline curbs banks’ 
incentives to adopt risks (Martinez Peria and Schmukler 2001) and reduces the 
impact of regulatory lags less on vulnerability to banking crises.10  These 
reasons suggest the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2:  The impact of the time elapsed since the last banking 
regulation reform on the country’s vulnerability to banking crises is larger 
at lower levels of liberalization of the financial system. 
 
  
                                                 
9 This effect’s direction is not necessarily intuitive.  In theory, it is possible that regulatory lags should not matter or 
matter less at lower levels of liberalization because there are fewer opportunities to abuse lags, or because 
supervision becomes easier.  I thank Covadonga Meseguer for these suggestions. 
10 An additional way in which the number of actors may affect the country’s vulnerability to banking crises is that 
less liberalized markets are characterized by relatively fewer banks participating in the system and monopolies.  
With fewer actors in the banking system, any panic or run affecting one or few banks can cause a systemic crisis. 
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Empirical evidence 
Research design 
 
The dependent variable is Crisis onset.  It is coded 1 the first year of a 
banking crisis, and zero otherwise.  Data come from Laeven and Valencia 
(2010).  This dataset includes both systemic and borderline banking crises, 
updating Caprio et al.’s (2005) dataset.11  The beginning of a crisis is defined 
by two events:  (1) “significant signs of financial distress in the banking 
system,” and (2) “significant banking policy intervention measures in response 
to significant losses in the banking system” (Laeven and Valencia 2010:6).12  
The dataset codes 374 country-year observations as experiencing a banking 
crisis.13  I coded as Crisis onset the first year of the crisis.14  There are 142 
episodes coded as crisis onsets in this dataset, with the following distribution 
according to income groups: 30 in low income countries, 38 in lower middle 
income countries, 37 in upper middle income countries, and 77 in high income 
countries.  Figure 1 shows the number of banking crisis onset per year; figure 
2 compares the number of banking crisis onset on the background of total 
ongoing banking crises, and figure 3 breaks down the crisis onsets by country 
income group. 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
11 This dataset improves the previous version (Laeven and Valencia 2008) because it also reports the end date of 
crisis episodes.   
12 A policy intervention is considered significant if the government uses at least three of the following six measures: 
1) extensive liquidity support (5 percent of deposits and liabilities to nonresidents); 2) bank restructuring costs (at 
least 3 percent of GDP); 3) significant bank nationalizations; 4) significant guarantees put in place; 5) significant asset 
purchases (at least 5 percent of GDP), and 6) deposit freezes and bank holidays (Laeven and Valencia 2010:7). 
13 The distribution of the of crisis by income groups is the following: 88 in low income countries, 105 in lower 
middle income countries, 104 in upper middle income countries, and 77 in high income countries. 
14 In cases in which there is more than one consecutive crisis, I included the year of the beginning of the second 
crises as another crisis onset (for example, Brazil 1994 and Congo 1994). 
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FIGURE 1: BANKING CRISIS ONSET PER YEAR AND NUMBER OF COUNTRIES INCLUDED IN THE SAMPLE 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2: BANKING CRISIS ONSET PER YEAR AND NUMBER OF COUNTRIES EXPERIENCING BANKING 
CRISES 
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FIGURE 3: BANKING CRISIS ONSET PER YEAR BY COUNTRY INCOME GROUP 
 
 
 
The main independent variables are coded from Abied, Detragiache and 
Tressel’s (ADT) dataset on financial reforms (Abiad et al. 2010).  This dataset 
includes information on the dates, type and intensity of financial reforms.  
They code seven dimensions of financial sector policy (credit controls, 
interest rate controls, entry barriers, state ownership in the banking sector, 
financial account restrictions, prudential regulations and supervision of the 
banking sector, and security market policy).  Each dimension is given a score 
from zero to three (full liberalization), and all the scores are combined in a 0-
21 index of financial liberalization. 
I separate ADT’s liberalization index in Prudential supervision, and 
Liberalization.  I measure Prudential supervision using the ADT’s “banking 
sector supervision” variable.  This is a categorical variable that codes both de 
facto and de jure indicators of strength of banking supervision.15  It is coded 0 
(non regulated and unsupervised), 1 (less regulated and supervised), 2 (largely 
regulated and supervised), or 3 (highly regulated and supervised).  
Liberalization is the ADT’s liberalization index excluding banking sector’s 
supervision.  It ranges from 0 to 18 (minimum to maximum degrees of 
liberalization). 
Years since reform is a count variable of the number of years elapsed 
since the change in the ADT’s score for banking sector supervision, as long as 
there was a change during the period included in the sample.  Counting from 
any change in the banking sector supervision’s score has two drawbacks.  
                                                 
15 For the detailed description of this variable’s coding rules, see Appendix 1. 
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First, given that I only consider changes in the score for this variable, it is 
possible that I do not capture all the prudential regulation’s reforms.  
However, changes in the banking sector supervision’s score capture significant 
changes in banking legislation.  Second, using any change in this score may 
treat equally changes of different magnitude.  However, out of 148 changes in 
the ADT’s score for banking sector supervision, only 11 have implied a two-
point increase in the score. 
I control for several factors that may affect the likelihood of banking crisis 
occurrence that are common in the literature.  The regulatory environment 
can also be affected by restriction of capital movements.  International 
capital flows can affect the volatility of domestic interest rates and of 
deposits.  I include Capital Openness, Chinn and Ito’s index measuring the 
extensity of capital controls based on the information from the IMF’s Annual 
Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (Chinn and Ito 
2008). 
The literature suggests different controls for monetary and exchange 
policy.  Ergungor and Thomson (2005:3) find that banking crises “tend to 
follow periods of expansionary monetary and fiscal policy.”  Although there is 
no consensus regarding the linkages between inflation and banking crisis 
onset, I control for inflation.  Inflation (log) is the natural log of the rate of 
price change in the economy as a whole.  The World Bank (2010) is the source 
of these data.   
I use two controls for the exchange regime.  Exchange rate regime is 
Reinhard and Rogoff’s coarse classification.  Alternatively, Peg controls for 
the de facto exchange rate regime, following Reinhard and Rogoff’s coarse 
classification (Reinhart and Rogoff 2004).  Peg is a dichotomous variable that 
equals 1 when there is no separate legal tender, when there is a pre-
announced peg or currency board arrangement, when there is a pre-
announced horizontal band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2%, or when 
there is a de facto peg (Reinhart and Rogoff 2004).  The source of this data is 
Reinhart and Rogoff’s updated chronology. 
The market’s depth can also affect the country’s vulnerability to banking 
crises (Angkinand et al. 2010; Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache 2005).  
Therefore, I include the ratio M2/reserves (World Bank 2010).  Given that 
some literature argues that crises are caused by excessive credit creation that 
leads to financial bubbles (Goldstein and Turner 1996:12), I include controls 
for Domestic Credit/GDP  and for Real interest (Ergungor and Thomson 
2005:5).   
To control for volatility and fluctuations that may cause financial 
instability, I include two variables.  Trade volatility, measured as change in 
trade as a percentage of the GDP, and Domestic credit growth, measured as 
percent change in domestic credit.  Both variables are built using World Bank 
data (2010) and are usually included in models of banking crises (e.g., 
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Angkinand et al. 2010; Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache 2005; Duttagupta and 
Cashin 2008; Gavin and Hausmann 1996).  
I also include a series of economic and political controls: In the baseline 
model, GDPPC measures the GDP per capita (Angkinand et al. 2010), GDP 
growth (as suggested by Angkinand et al. 2010; Demirgüc-Kunt and 
Detragiache 2005) controls for economic activity and eventually, recession, 
and Polity2, the 21-point combined index of regime, ranging from 10 for a 
highly democratic country to -10 for a highly autocratic state (Marshall and 
Jaggers 2007). 
Other specifications control for important factors that could affect the 
likelihood of a country experiencing a systemic banking crisis.  I include Trend 
– the number of years elapsed since 1973 -, and Diffusion (crises), a count of 
the number of banking crises in the world in a given year to account both for 
possible time-dependent world-wide vulnerability and for contagion effects in 
interconnected financial markets (e.g., Allen et al. 2009).  I also control for 
Diffusion (supervision), representing the average level of banking supervision 
in the sample in a given year.  This variable accounts for the international 
origin of important supervision regulation and the possibility that stricter 
banking is a product of changes in international norms and worldwide 
domestic adaptation. 
To control for the country’s underlying vulnerability to banking crises, I 
include three controls: Currency crisis, a dichotomous variable coded 1 if the 
country experienced a currency crisis in a given year (data from Angkinand et 
al. 2010), controls for arguments linking banking and currency crises.  Finally, 
Crises count is the number of previous banking crises in the country during the 
sample span. 
The final set of controls expands the political variables included in models 
predicting banking crises.  Scholars have started exploring the role of 
partisanship on banking crises’ onset (e.g., Broz 2011).  It is possible that 
right-leaning governments are less likely to bailout banks in distress and, 
therefore, banks adopt less risky behavior.  I run additional models to test 
whether the government’s party ID has an independent effect of the country’s 
vulnerability to banking crises, and whether party ID alters the relationships 
under study here.  Right reflects the partisanship of the executive.  It is 
coded 1 when the EXECRLC item in the Database of Political Institutions 
equals 1, and zero otherwise (Beck et al. 2001; Beck et al. 2008; Keefer 
2007). 
It is also possible that longer regulatory lags are absorbing both the effect 
of available time for market actors to escape tight regulations, and of a 
slower decision-making process.  For example, a system with more veto 
players could have problems not only to adapt prudential regulation to market 
development, but also to adopt decisions that would make the economic 
environment more stable and resilient to banking crises.  I therefore include 
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measures of institutional and political veto players (POLCONIII and POLCONV, 
from Henisz 2010). 
Finally, I control for political instability.  It is possible that banking crises 
are a part of a more general process of unrest that translates in a weakened 
trust in banking institutions.  Lack of regulatory updates could be related to 
the perception of deeper causes (or causes outside the banking sector) for 
banking crises onset.  Political instability is a count of the number of 
disturbances such as riots, strikes, anti-government demonstrations or 
assassinations in a country in a given year (Banks 2011). 
Modeling choice 
There are three methodological approaches in the literature on banking 
crises.16  The first strategy implies building a chronology of events and the 
behavior of the variables of interest, and then comparing the behavior of 
variables before and after the crisis.  The goal is to infer “possible causal 
patterns” (Kaminsky and Reinhart 1999:474)  The second tactic is a 
computation of the probability of the occurrence of a banking crisis, using 
some form of maximum likelihood technique (Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache 
1999, 2005; Noy 2004).  Finally, Duttagupta and Cashin (2008) used Binary 
Classification Tree to identify the most significant variables (and their 
threshold) associated with increased vulnerability to banking crisis.   
I run multivariate logistic regressions for panel data because I am more 
interested in individualizing the direct and indirect impact of regulatory lags 
on crisis onset´s likelihood, than in evaluating the pre- and post-crisis 
behavior of economic variables.  I include fixed effects to account for 
different variables’ means in different countries.  The inclusion of fixed 
effects is also a way to control for institutional and bureaucratic 
characteristics that may explain both different vulnerability to banking crises, 
and the very regulatory lags.  The sample includes 75 developed and 
developing countries (see Appendix 2).  I only include the year of the crisis 
onset and exclude the following years reported as still experiencing crisis, a 
standard practice in the literature on banking crises (e.g., Angkinand et al. 
2010; Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache 2005; Domaç and Martinez Peria 
2003).17  For descriptive statistics, see Table 1. 
 
 
 
                                                 
16 The first two approaches are identified by Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache as the “signals approach” and the 
“multivariate probability approach” (Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache 2005).  See also Duttagupta and Cashin 
(2008:3). 
17 The crisis itself can affect the behavior of some of the explanatory variables in observations following the crisis 
onset, particularly during the crisis.  Therefore, these observations are usually excluded from the sample in models 
predicting crisis onset (Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache 2005:7).  
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TABLE 1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
VARIABLE OBS MEAN STD. DEV. MIN MAX 
CRISIS ONSET 2638 .0307051 .1725502 0 1 
BANKING CRISIS 2638 .0921152 .2892434 0 1 
PRUDENTIAL SUPERVISIONT-1 2638 .772555 .9578791 0 3 
LIBERALIZATIONT-1 2638 9.465504 5.588206 0 18 
CAPITAL OPENNESS T-1 2465 .0903061 1.537148 -1.831187 2.500014 
YEARS SINCE REFORM 2548 7.511381 6.186941 0 30 
INFLATION (LOG) T-1 2447 2.268277 1.41905 -3.495929 9.644866 
M2/RESERVES T-1 2121 7425.196 172949.4 0 4738331 
DOMESTIC CREDIT/GDP T-1 2437 2381.316 18604.55 -1.601714 209059.8 
REAL INTEREST T-1 2297 4816.556 204291.7 -6547.28 9693343 
EXCHANGE RATE REGIMET-1 2507 2.49302 1.301149 1 6 
PEG T-1 2638 .2361638 .4248045 0 1 
TRADE VOLATILITY T-1 2519 1.124834 8.574622 -99.07393 129.6192 
DOMESTIC CREDIT GROWTHT-1 2417 -1.620282 720.0223 -11698.8 15494.58 
GDPPC T-1 2564 6.88658 8.874677 .102286 40.61784 
GDP GROWTH T-1 2557 3.356897 4.838184 -44.9 26.4 
POLITY2 T-1 2616 3.416667 6.970405 -10 10 
RIGHT T-1 2484 .3059581 .4609048 0 1 
POLCON T-1 2011 .3090303 .2167978 0 .73 
POLITICAL INSTABILITY T-1 2605 2.560461 4.662814 0 49 
TREND 2638 17.95679 9.512323 1 33 
DIFFUSION (CRISES) T-1 2638 11.21835 9.637106 0 30 
DIFFUSION (SUPERVISION) 2548 .7938832 .6805514 .084507 1.977778 
CURRENCY CRISIS 2636 .0436267 .2043019 0 1 
CURRENCY CRISIS T-1 2634 .0447988 .2069012 0 1 
CRISES COUNT 2638 .4787718 .6353006 0 4 
 
Findings 
Models 1 to 5 show different specifications to make clear the effect of the 
regulation variables and of the inclusion of the main explanatory variables 
(See Table 2).  Model 1 includes all the variables suggested by the economic 
literature.  Inflation, Domestic credit/GDP, and Domestic credit/GDP growth 
are positive and statistically significant predictors of the likelihood of crisis 
onset.  Model 2 includes regulation variables that capture the degree of 
liberalization in the financial market and of banking sector’s supervision, and 
the country’s capital controls: higher levels of Prudential regulation are 
associated with a lower likelihood of crisis onset, whereas Liberalization is 
positively associated, as suggested by the literature.  Capital openness does 
not achieve conventional levels of statistical significance.  The inclusion of 
these variables increases two of the economic indicators’ standard errors, 
making both Inflation and Domestic credit/GDP growth statistically 
insignificant.   
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TABLE 2: PROBABILITY OF BANKING CRISIS ONSET.  ALL COUNTRIES – YEARS OF CRISIS OMITTED 
 MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 MODEL 4 MODEL 5 
 
COEFFICIENT 
(STD. ERR.) 
COEFFICIENT 
(STD. ERR.) 
COEFFICIENT 
(STD. ERR.) 
COEFFICIENT 
(STD. ERR.) 
COEFFICIENT 
(STD. ERR.) 
REGULATION      
   PRUDENTIAL 
      SUPERVISIONT-1 
 -1.143 
(.358)*** 
-.974 
(.387)** 
-1.192 
(.395)*** 
-1.094 
(.331)*** 
   LIBERALIZATIONT-1  .137 
(.054)** 
.130 
(.056)** 
.260 
(.079)*** 
.228 
(.063)*** 
   CAPITAL OPENNESS  T-1  -.312 
(.221) 
-.307 
(.224) 
-.298 
(.223) 
-.283 
(.174)* 
   YEARS SINCE REFORM   .019 
(.026) 
.135 
(.056)** 
.131 
(.046)*** 
   YEARS SINCE REFORM* 
       LIBERALIZATIONT-1 
   -.012 
(.005)** 
-.011 
(.004)** 
MONETARY AND 
EXCHANGE  
     
   INFLATION (LOG) T-1 .304 
(.110)*** 
-.002 
(.156) 
-.005 
(.156) 
-.032 
(.158) 
 
   M2/RESERVES T-1 -.003 
(.003) 
-.003 
(.005) 
-.003 
(.005) 
-.003 
(.006) 
 
   DOMESTIC 
      CREDIT/GDP T-1 
.016 
(.006)*** 
.017 
(.007)** 
.016 
(.007) 
.016 
(.007)** 
 
   REAL INTEREST T-1 -.0001 
(.0003) 
-.0002 
(.0003) 
-.0002 
(.0003) 
-.0002 
(.0003) 
 
   PEG T-1 .379 
(.384) 
.437 
(.457) 
.470 
(.461) 
.682 
(.480) 
 
VOLATILITY      
   TRADE VOLATILITY T-1 -.015 
(.011) 
.007 
(.020) 
.007 
(.020) 
.007 
(.020) 
 
   DOMESTIC CREDIT  
      GROWTH T-1 
.021 
(.010)** 
.026 
(.016) 
.025 
(.016) 
.023 
(.017) 
 
EC. AND POLITICAL 
CONTROLS 
     
   GDPPC T-1 .110 
(.077) 
.167 
(.136) 
.168 
(.138) 
.201 
(.144) 
 
   GDP GROWTH T-1 -.035 
(.023) 
-.053 
(.036) 
-.051 
(.036) 
-.047 
(.036) 
 
   POLITY2 T-1 -.004 
(.029) 
-.070 
(.044) 
-.075 
(.046) 
-.086 
(.046)* 
 
NUMBER OF OBS 1735 1039 1001 1001 1462 
NUMBER OF GROUPS 71 45 45 45 55 
LR CHI2 (10) = 43.76 (13) = 36.50 (14) = 34.78 (15) = 40.59 (5) = 29.40 
PROB > CHI2 0.0000 0.0005 0.0016 0.0004 0.0000 
PSEUDO-R2 .081 .110 .106 .124 .067 
AIC 515.1511 321.7313 320.6603 316.854 421.1248 
BIC 569.7388 386.0295 389.3828 390.4854 447.5626 
  Notes:  Panel logit coefficients with fixed effects.  Standard errors in italics.  Statistical significance is indicated as     
  follows: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
 
 
The number of years elapsed since the last prudential reform does not have a 
direct effect on crisis onset (Model 3) unless the indirect effect of 
liberalization is accounted for.  Model 4 shows that once the conditional 
effect of the rest of the regulatory context is taken into account (with the 
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inclusion of the interaction term), the coefficient associated with Years since 
reform is positive and statistically significant.  This effect is stronger at lower 
levels of liberalization, as indicated by the interaction term’s direction.  The 
statistical significance and direction of these two variables is consistent with 
the relationships posited by hypotheses 1 and 2.  Model 5 illustrates the effect 
of the regulatory variables omitting all the other controls, suggesting that 
these results are not an artifact of the combination of included controls.  
Their effect is not substantially different from the one produced by models 
that include all the controls suggested by the economic literature.  Comparing 
measures of goodness of fit (on the same sample, to avoid the distorting 
effect of different samples)18 suggests that the models including all the 
variables have a better statistical fit and explanatory power than the ones 
without the variables of interest for this paper.  Model 4 is used as baseline 
for robustness tests (see Table 3). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
18 These models are not reported. 
Regulatory lags,  l iberal izat ion,  and vulnerabi l i t y to systemic banking cr i ses  
D I V I S I Ó N  D E  E S T U D I O S  P O L Í T I C O S  1 7  
TABLE 3: PROBABILITY OF BANKING CRISIS ONSET.  ALL COUNTRIES – YEARS OF CRISIS OMITTED 
 MODEL 6 MODEL 7 MODEL 8 MODEL 9 MODEL 10 MODEL 11 MODEL 12 MODEL 13 MODEL 14 MODEL 15 
 
COEFF. 
(STD. ERR.) 
COEFF. 
(STD. ERR.) 
COEFF. 
(STD. ERR.) 
COEFF. 
(STD. ERR.) 
COEFF. 
(STD. ERR.) 
COEFF. 
(STD. ERR.) 
COEFF. 
(STD. ERR.) 
COEFF. 
(STD. ERR.) 
COEFF. 
(STD. ERR.) 
COEFF. 
(STD. ERR.) 
REGULATION           
PRUDENTIAL 
   SUPERVISIONT-1 
-1.203 
(.437)*** 
-.964 
(.418)** 
-.840 
(.454)* 
-1.177 
(.402)*** 
.164 
(.500) 
.579 
(.560) 
.488 
(.563) 
.449 
(.568) 
-.643 
(.584) 
.484 
(.563) 
LIBERALIZATIONT-1 .255 
(.116)** 
.189 
(.090)** 
.333 
(.099)** 
.260 
(.079)*** 
.764 
(.131)*** 
.885 
(.147)*** 
.872 
(.147)*** 
.863 
(.149)*** 
.828 
(.169)*** 
.879 
(.147)*** 
CAPITAL OPENNESST-1 -.296 
(.226) 
-.299 
(.225) 
-.320 
(.231) 
-.256 
(.225) 
-.778 
(.306)** 
-.947 
(.321)*** 
-.874 
(.322)*** 
-.883 
(.323)*** 
-.347 
(.369) 
-.886 
(.323)*** 
YEARS SINCE REFORM .133 
(.064)** 
.115 
(.057)** 
.139 
(.057)** 
.120 
(.056)** 
.323 
(.084)*** 
.393 
(.096)*** 
.381 
(.096)*** 
.359 
(.097)*** 
.374 
(.107)*** 
.385 
(.097)*** 
YEARS S. REFORM 
  *LIBERALIZATIONT-1 
-.012 
(.006)** 
-.011 
(.005)** 
-.013 
(.005)** 
-.011 
(.005)** 
-.024 
(.007)*** 
-.027 
(.008)*** 
-.026 
(.008)*** 
-.024 
(.008)*** 
-.030 
(.010)*** 
-.026 
(.008)*** 
MONETARY AND 
EXCHANGE  
          
INFLATION (LOG) T-1 -.032 
(.158) 
-.064 
(.159) 
-.044 
(.160) 
-.004 
(.162) 
-.293 
(.201) 
-.165 
(.213) 
-.117 
(.218) 
-.133 
(.219) 
-.129 
(.227) 
-.124 
(.219) 
M2/RESERVES T-1 -.003 
(.006) 
-.003 
(.006) 
-.003 
(.005) 
-.005 
(.007) 
-.001 
(.003) 
-.0007 
(.003) 
-.001 
(.003) 
-.0007 
(.003) 
-.001 
(.003) 
-.0009 
(.003) 
DOMESTIC 
   CREDIT/GDP T-1 
.016 
(.007)** 
.015 
(.008)** 
.017 
(.007)** 
.016 
(.008)** 
.029 
(.009)*** 
.033 
(.012)*** 
.033 
(.012)*** 
.033 
(.012)*** 
.026 
(.014)* 
.033 
(.012)*** 
REAL INTEREST T-1 -.0002 
(.0003) 
-.0002 
(.0003) 
-.0002 
(.0003) 
-.0001 
(.0003) 
-.0007 
(.0004)** 
-.0007 
(.0004)* 
-.0006 
(.0004) 
-.0006 
(.0004) 
-.0006 
(.0004) 
-.0006 
(.0004) 
PEG T-1 .688 
(.492) 
.746 
(.482) 
.574 
(.498) 
.638 
(.483) 
.707 
(.625) 
.710 
(.661) 
.559 
(.663) 
.365 
(.698) 
-.802 
(.907) 
.559 
(.662) 
VOLATILITY           
TRADE VOLATILITY T-1 .007 
(.020) 
.007 
(.020) 
.009 
(.020) 
.013 
(.022) 
.015 
(.022) 
.008 
(.023) 
.011 
(.024) 
.012 
(.024) 
.035 
(.025 
.010 
(.024) 
DOMESTIC CREDIT  
   GROWTH T-1 
.023 
(.017) 
.023 
(.017) 
.021 
(.017) 
.025 
(.017) 
.024 
(.021) 
.028 
(.023) 
.029 
(.024) 
.029 
(.024) 
.026 
(.026) 
.029 
(.024) 
EC. AND POLITICAL 
CONTROLS 
          
GDPPC T-1 .199 
(.147) 
.187 
(.146) 
.243 
(.154) 
.183 
(.144) 
.295 
(.228) 
.374 
(.250) 
.359 
(.250) 
.335 
(.249) 
.412 
(.256) 
.375 
(.248) 
GDP GROWTH T-1 -.047 
(.037) 
-.047 
(.036) 
-.054 
(.036) 
-.045 
(.037) 
-.060 
(.044) 
-.057 
(.045) 
-.056 
(.046) 
-.054 
(.046) 
-.031 
(.048) 
-.052 
(.047) 
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 MODEL 6 MODEL 7 MODEL 8 MODEL 9 MODEL 10 MODEL 11 MODEL 12 MODEL 13 MODEL 14 MODEL 15 
 
COEFF. 
(STD. ERR.) 
COEFF. 
(STD. ERR.) 
COEFF. 
(STD. ERR.) 
COEFF. 
(STD. ERR.) 
COEFF. 
(STD. ERR.) 
COEFF. 
(STD. ERR.) 
COEFF. 
(STD. ERR.) 
COEFF. 
(STD. ERR.) 
COEFF. 
(STD. ERR.) 
COEFF. 
(STD. ERR.) 
POLITY2 T-1 -.087 
(.047)* 
-.087 
(.047)* 
-.073 
(.047) 
-.080 
(.045)* 
.048 
(.056) 
.084 
(.060) 
.079 
(.061) 
.068 
(.063) 
.061 
(.084) 
.083 
(.061) 
RIGHT T-1        -.047 
(.570) 
  
POLCON T-1         -.427 
(2.146) 
 
POLITICAL 
   INSTABILITY T-1
 
         .036 
(.052) 
OTHER CONTROLS           
TREND .003 
(.055) 
         
DIFFUSION 
    (CRISES T-1) 
 .032 
(.020) 
        
DIFFUSION 
   (SUPERVISION) 
  -.950 
(.652) 
       
CURRENCY CRISIS     1.557 
(.441)*** 
  .954 
(.519)*** 
.847 
(.534) 
-7.623 
(1.506)**
* 
-9.728 
(1.591)**
* 
CRISES COUNT     -6.307 
(1.042)*** 
-9.937 
(1.585)*** 
-9.658 
(1.587)*** 
-9.474 
(1.586)*** 
1.236 
(.298)*** 
1.533 
(.302)*** 
CRISES COUNT2      1.552 
(.300)*** 
1.522 
(.300)*** 
1.479 
(.299)*** 
1.248 
(.547)** 
.954 
(.516)* 
NUMBER OF OBS         1001 1001 1001 1001 1001 1001 1001 950 738 1000 
NUMBER OF GROUPS    45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 35 45 
LR CHI2 (16) = 
40.59 
(16) = 
43.20 
(16) = 
42.79 
(16) = 
51.50 
(16)=123.
09 
(17)=140.
69 
(18)=143.
89 
(19)=136.
42 
(19)=101.
43 
(16)=144.
24 
PSEUDO-R2 .124 .132 .131 .152 .376 .430 .439 .429 .402 .441 
PROB > CHI2        0.0006 0.0003 0.0003 0.0000 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
AIC 318.8509 316.2398 316.6564 307.9448 236.3573 220.7531 219.5582 219.5862 189.0837 221.1075 
BIC 397.391 394.7799 395.1965 386.4849 314.8974 304.2019 307.9158 311.859 276.5587 314.3549 
Notes:  Panel logit coefficients with fixed effects.  Standard errors in italics.  Statistical significance is indicated as follows: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
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Models 6 to 11 show different specifications to explore the robustness of the 
relationships of interest and to enhance the model specification.  Model 11 is 
used for estimating substantive impacts because of its better fit.  Across 
models, the coefficient associated with Years since reform is positive and 
statistically significant, providing support to hypothesis 1.  Holding other 
things constant, the likelihood of banking crisis onset increases as time 
elapses since a significant banking reform.  However, the substantive impact 
of time is conditional on the degree of financial liberalization.  As stated in 
hypothesis 2, I expect regulatory lags to have a larger impact on the 
likelihood of crisis onset at lower levels of liberalization.  The negative and 
statistically significant coefficient associated with the interaction term 
provides support to hypothesis 2.  In order to interpret the effect of 
regulatory lags on the likelihood of crisis onset, figure 4 plots the odds ratio 
increase of an additional year, conditional on the level of liberalization.   
 
FIGURE 4: ODDS OF EXPERIENCING A BANKING CRISIS FOR EACH ADDITIONAL YEAR ELAPSED SINCE 
THE BANKING SECTOR REGULATION REFORM, AT DIFFERENT LEVELS OF FINANCIAL SYSTEM 
LIBERALIZATION 
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The joint effect of Years since reform and the interaction term is statistically 
significant at conventional levels when Liberalization is ≤ 11.75.19  At the 
lowest possible level of Liberalization, each additional year increases the 
odds of crisis onset in .46.  At a low level of Liberalization (mean minus a 
standard deviation, around 4 in the 18-point scale), each additional year 
increases the odds of crisis onset in .32.  Finally, at when Liberalization 
equals 9, each additional year elapsed since the last prudential reform 
increases the odds of a banking crisis by .16. 
Regarding regulation, and consistent with the literature, both financial 
liberalization and banking deregulation are associated with higher likelihood 
of banking crisis’ onset.  However, only the impact of Liberalization is robust 
to all model specifications.  Capital openness is negatively associated with 
crisis onset, but its coefficient is statistically significant only when previous 
banking crises are included in the model.  On the contrary, Prudential 
supervision loses statistical significance when controls for previous banking 
crises are included.20   
Very few of the economic controls achieve acceptable levels of statistical 
significance in these models:  Domestic credit/GDP is a robust predictor of 
crisis onset, suggesting that larger levels of credit increase the country’s 
vulnerability to financial bubbles.  Real interest is consistently negative, but 
it only achieves .05 and .1 levels of statistical significance in models 9 and 19, 
respectively.  
Regarding additional controls, Model 6 shows that a control for an 
eventual trend in the data does not affect the results.  The Trend variable is 
statistically insignificant.  However, this also suggests that the effect of 
regulatory lags is not absorbing the impact of the mere passage of time.  
Similar results are obtained when controlling for diffusion of banking 
supervision standards (Diffusion (supervision)), and for the diffusion of 
banking crises (Diffusion (crises)).21  It is possible, however, that a more 
sophisticated measure of diffusion would better capture the effect of 
contemporary bank crises in other countries.   
The simultaneous presence of a currency crisis is also associated with a 
higher likelihood of banking crisis onset (see Model 9).  More research should 
shed light regarding the nature of this association:  it is possible that currency 
crises have similar roots as bank crisis, and the variable Currency crisis is 
merely absorbing the effect of omitted variables.  It is noteworthy that the 
lagged variable (Currency crisis t-1) does not have a significant impact on crisis 
                                                 
19 The sample mean for this variable is 9.47, and its standard deviation is 5.59.  In the subsample used in these 
models, the mean for this variable is 8.14, and its standard deviation is 5.27.  Liberalization is ≤ 11.75 for 684 
observations. 
20 This is consistent with Mitchener’s argument regarding possible contradictory effects that capital and reserve 
requirements may have on banks’ propensity to risky behavior (Mitchener 2005:157). 
21 Diffusion (crises) achieves statistical significance if included in Model 12 (that is, when controlling also for 
currency crises and the count of past crises).  Its inclusion does not affect the main variables included in that model, 
but negatively affects the goodness of fit of that model.  This specification is not reported. 
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onset.  Its inclusion does not alter the results reported in Model 9, but 
decreases the model’s overall fit. 
Model 10 includes the number of previous banking crisis episodes (within 
the sample period).  The inclusion of this variable substantially increases the 
explanatory power of the models (according to both the pseudo-R2 and the 
Bayesian criteria).  Surprisingly, the coefficient associated to this variable is 
negative, suggesting that a country that has experienced more systematic 
banking crises in the past is less vulnerable to banking crises.  Intuitively, 
however, more crises in the past could suggest a more vulnerable banking 
system.  Model 11 includes a squared count of previous crises, showing that 
this relationship is not linear.  More research should explore this 
counterintuitive result.  It is possible that the number of previous crises is 
absorbing other regulatory reforms that are not contemplated in the variables 
included in these models, or that previous crises make economic agents’ 
behaviors more cautious, reducing the system’s vulnerability. 
 
Politics beyond regulation 
At lower levels of liberalization, market actors have strong incentives to find 
ways to escape regulation and adopt risky behavior.  It is more likely that they 
find these opportunities the more time old prudential regulation stays in 
place.  The theory does not suggest that regulatory lags should be conditioned 
by factors other than level of liberalization, such as typical political factors.  
However, does partisanship affect the effect of regulatory lags? Furthermore, 
is it possible that regulatory lags are mere epiphenomena of deeper political 
causes for banking crisis vulnerability? 
Model 13 shows that the government’s partisanship does not have an 
independent effect of the country’s vulnerability to banking crises.  Neither 
Right nor Center-right (variables coding the party ID of the government, 
contemporary or lagged) has a significant impact on banking crisis onset.  
Their inclusion does not affect the direction or statistical significance of the 
results reported in Model 12. 
As mentioned above, longer regulatory lags could absorb both the effect 
of available time for market actors to escape tight regulations, and of a 
slower decision-making process in the country.  Neither of the measures of 
veto players (POLCONIII and POLCONV, either contemporaneus or lagged) 
achieves statistical significance (see Model 14).  Finally, Political instability 
does not have a significant effect on banking crisis onset (see Model 15).  The 
inclusion of these variables does not affect the relationships of interest. 
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I also test whether partisanship or the two veto player measures have an 
indirect impact on the likelihood of crisis onset, by interacting each of these 
three variables (and their alternative measurements) with regulatory lags.  
Again, neither of these three variables or their interaction terms achieves 
statistical significance.  Furthermore, the results reported in Model 12 are not 
altered by these different specifications.  For space considerations, Table 3 
only shows the inclusion of one of the permutations of the political controls 
(the lagged values), and omits the models including interaction terms. 
 
Income groups and regulatory lags 
I conducted further robustness checks by changing the sample (see Table 4).  
First, the inclusion of fixed effects prevents knowing the effect of regulatory 
lags in countries with different levels of development.  I run the baseline 
model (Model 12) on a sample excluding most developed countries or 
advanced economies (see Model 16),22 and excluding both the most developed 
and the poorest countries (Model 17).23  Although some of the controls behave 
differently (notably, Currency crisis and Crisis count) or achieve acceptable 
levels of statistical significance (e.g., GDPPC), the main results are not 
altered.  Finally, I also re-run these models on samples including all the 
years.24  Again, the main results hold across samples. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
22 These models exclude countries from income group 4, identified in Appendix 2. 
23 These models exclude countries from income groups 1 and 4, identified in Appendix 2.  I do not run models on 
samples exclusively of the most developed countries (income group 4) or the least developed countries (income 
group 1) because of sample size restrictions. 
24 Recall the original samples excluded years of crisis after the onset. 
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TABLE 4: PROBABILITY OF BANKING CRISIS ONSET.  DIFFERENT SAMPLES 
 ALL COUNTRIES ALL DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
UPPER-MIDDLE AND LOWER-
MIDDLE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
 MODEL 12 MODEL 12A(†) MODEL 16 MODEL 16A(†) MODEL 17 MODEL 17A(†) 
 
COEFF. 
(STD. ERR.) 
COEFF. 
(STD. ERR.) 
COEFF. 
(STD. ERR.) 
COEFF. 
(STD. ERR.) 
COEFF. 
(STD. ERR.) 
COEFF. 
(STD. ERR.) 
REGULATION       
PRUDENTIAL 
   SUPERVISIONT-1 
.488 
(.563) 
.411 
(.537) 
1.146 
(.719) 
1.257 
(.701)* 
1.102 
(.767) 
1.176 
(.750) 
LIBERALIZATIONT-1 .872 
(.147)*** 
.887 
(.146)*** 
.649 
(.160)*** 
.651 
(.159)*** 
.776 
(.190)*** 
.785 
(.189)*** 
CAPITAL  
   OPENNESS T-1 
-.874 
(.322)*** 
-.922 
(.319)*** 
-.681 
(.347)** 
-.764 
(.347)** 
-.978 
(.384)*** 
-1.081 
(.387)*** 
YEARS SINCE  
   REFORM 
.381 
(.096)*** 
.393 
(.094)*** 
.374 
(.101)*** 
.396 
(.100)*** 
.455 
(.133)*** 
.467 
(.132)*** 
YEARS S.REFORM* 
LIBERALIZATIONT-1 
-.026 
(.008)*** 
-.027 
(.008)*** 
-.018 
(.009)** 
-.020 
(.009)** 
-.025 
(.011)** 
-.027 
(.010)*** 
MONETARY AND 
EXCHANGE  
      
INFLATION(LOG) T-
1 
-.117 
(.218) 
-.157 
(.219) 
-.121 
(.224) 
-.155 
(.222) 
-.220 
(.251) 
-.258 
(.249) 
M2/RESERVES T-1 -.001 
(.003) 
-.001 
(.003) 
-.001 
(.003) 
-.001 
(.003) 
.045 
(.021)** 
.046 
(.021)** 
DOMESTIC 
   CREDIT/GDP T-1 
.033 
(.012)*** 
.027 
(.013)** 
.031 
(.013)** 
.024 
(.013)* 
.029 
(.016)* 
.019 
(.014) 
REAL INTEREST T-1 -.0006 
(.0004) 
-.0004 
(.0005) 
-.0007 
(.0004) 
-.0005 
(.0005) 
-.0007 
(.0004)* 
-.0006 
(.0004) 
PEG T-1 .559 
(.663) 
.749 
(.632) 
.205 
(.669) 
.530 
(.631) 
.860 
(.735) 
1.176 
(.698)* 
VOLATILITY       
TRADE VOLATILITY 
T-1 
.011 
(.024) 
.011 
(.023) 
.019 
(.025) 
.020 
(.024) 
.026 
(.029)1 
.031 
(.028) 
DOMESTIC CREDIT  
   GROWTH T-1 
.029 
(.024) 
.002 
(.016) 
.026 
(.025) 
.005 
(.017) 
.038 
(.026) 
.014 
(.018) 
EC. AND POLITICAL        
GDPPC T-1 .359 
(.250) 
.442 
(.250)* 
2.273 
(.870)*** 
2.032 
(.802)** 
2.620 
(.953)*** 
2.520 
(.870)*** 
GDP GROWTH T-1 -.056 
(.046) 
-.056 
(.044) 
-.053 
(.049) 
-.055 
(.046) 
-.055 
(.058) 
-.063 
(.055) 
POLITY2 T-1 .079 
(.061) 
.122 
(.055)** 
.038 
(.060) 
.091 
(.055)* 
.076 
(.069) 
.131 
(.062)** 
OTHER CONTROLS       
CURRENCY CRISIS  .954 
(.519)*** 
-9.787 
(1.544)*** 
-9.057 
(1.594)*** 
-9.201 
(1.517)*** 
-10.314 
(2.013)*** 
-10.589 
(1.966)*** 
CRISES COUNT -9.658 
(1.587)*** 
1.514 
(.291)*** 
1.349 
(.305)*** 
1.433 
(.291)*** 
1.575 
(.371)*** 
1.667 
(.361)*** 
CRISES COUNT2 1.522 
(.300)*** 
.834 
(.507)* 
.985 
(.522)* 
.772 
(.514) 
.944 
(.599) 
.686 
(.594) 
NUMBER OF OBS         1001 1101 869 961 677 760 
NUMBER OF 
GROUPS    
45 45 39 39 31 31 
LR CHI2 (18)=143.89 (18)=151.98 (18)=123.54 (18)=130.47 (18)=110.24 (18) = 117.09 
PSEUDO-R2 .439 .445 .424 .428 .467 .472 
PROB > CHI2        0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
AIC 219.5582 225.7745 203.7883 210.097 161.7019 166.9829 
BIC 307.9158 315.846 289.6005 297.7205 243.02 250.3827 
Notes:  Panel logit coefficients with fixed effects.  Standard errors in italics.  Statistical significance is indicated as follows: 
p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. (†) These models include all years.  
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Model’s explanatory power 
The pseudo-R2 may not provide a satisfactory indication of logit models’ fit.  
The partial correlation between the predicted probability of a crisis onset and 
the observed crisis onset is .61.  Table 5 shows the number of observations 
where crisis onsets were (not) observed, and the model 12’s predicted 
probability of observing a crisis onset.  For simplicity, I divided the predicted 
probabilities in larger and smaller than .5 (there are no cases where predicted 
probability equals .5). 
 
TABLE 5:  OBSERVED AND PREDICTED CRISES ONSET.  NUMBER OF CASES AND MEAN PREDICTED 
PROBABILITY (ACCORDING TO MODEL 11) 
  PREDICTED CRISIS ONSET 
  P<.5 P>.5 
OBSERVED CRISIS 
ONSET 
ONSET=0 
N=942 
(.027) 
N=2 
(.585) 
ONSET=1 
N=45 
(.202) 
N=12 
(.773) 
Note: N: number of observations.  Mean predicted probability between parentheses. 
 
According to Table 5, the model accurately predicts 942 cases where there 
was no crisis onset, estimating an average probability for those cases lower 
than .03.  The model estimates a probability of crisis larger than .5 for two 
observations where there was no crisis onset:  Nicaragua 1989 and Bulgaria 
1995.  Regarding observed crisis onset, the model seems to perform poorly:  
12 of the observed crisis onsets have a predicted probability >.5 (on average, 
the predicted probability for those observations is .77), but 45 of the 
observed crises have a predicted probability <.5.  This suggests a very high 
percentage of Type II errors (false negatives).  However, a closer look to those 
cases suggests that the table is obscuring the accuracy of the prediction. 
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TABLE 6:  OBSERVED CRISES ONSET WITH PREDICTED PROBABILITY >.5 (ACCORDING TO MODEL 12) 
COUNTRY CRISIS YEAR PREDICTED PROBABILITY AVERAGE PREDICTED PROBABILITY 
ALGERIA 1990 .156 .038 
ARGENTINA 
1989 .117 
.071 1995 .190 
2001 .056 
BANGLADESH 1987 .435 .037 
BRAZIL 1994 .00001 .043 
BULGARIA 1996 .282 .1 
CAMEROON 
1987 .352 
.04 
1995 .003 
CHINA 1998 .079 .077 
COLOMBIA 
1982 .334 
.034 
1998 .056 
COSTA RICA 
1987 .295 
.037 
1994 .0009 
D. REPUBLIC 2003 .384 .125 
ECUADOR 
1982 .319 
.056 
1998 .177 
EGYPT 1980 .064 .031 
GHANA 1982 .057 .032 
INDONESIA 1997 .301 .038 
JAMAICA 1996 .075 .043 
KENYA 
1985 .282 
.033 
1992 .0006 
MADAGASCAR 1988 .313 .034 
MALAYSIA 1997 .177 .038 
MEXICO 
1981 .274 
.048 
1994 .061 
MOROCCO 1980 .036 .045 
NEPAL 1988 .399 .036 
NICARAGUA 1990 .405 .25 
NIGERIA 1991 .064 .038 
NORWAY 1991 .296 .04 
PARAGUAY 1995 .396 .059 
PERU 1983 .080 .031 
PHILIPPINES 1997 .145 .04 
THAILAND 
1983 .097 
.038 
1997 .316 
TUNISIA 1991 .268 .031 
TURKEY 
1982 .380 
.034 
2000 .040 
UGANDA 1994 .030 .05 
U.S.A. 1988 .190 .031 
URUGUAY 2002 .480 .059 
VENEZUELA 1994 .420 .036 
ZIMBABWE 1995 .197 .06 
Note: Highlighted cells are Type II errors 
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Table 6 shows the 45 observations where crisis onset were observed, but with 
a predicted probability smaller than .5.  Table 6’s last column also show the 
average crisis onset’s probability for the country in the sample.  In most 
cases, the predicted probability – although low in absolute terms, doubles (or 
more) the average predicted probability of a banking crisis in a given country.  
This table identifies nine cases where the model predicts a crisis onset 
probability that is lower than the average probability (cells highlighted in 
Table 6).  Figure 5 plots both the observed and the estimated probability of 
crisis onset for selected countries.   
 
 
FIGURE 5: CRISES PREDICTED AND OBSERVED.  ILLUSTRATIVE CASES WHERE PREDICTED PROBABILITY 
<.5 
       
        Argentina 2001 (Type II error) 
 
 
        
          Turkey 2000 (Type II error)                                 Cameroon 1995 (Type II error)         
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Conclusions 
This article explored the effect of states’ lags in regulation update on their 
likelihood of experiencing banking crises.  In spite of the clear importance of 
banking crises to the global economy, this subject remains underanalyzed, 
and the extant literature falls short with its explanations of crises.  I argue 
that delays in revising banks’ prudential regulation give opportunities for 
banks to adopt risky behavior.  This increases the country’s vulnerability to 
systemic banking crises.  This effect, however, is conditional on the level of 
liberalization of the financial market.  At lower levels of liberalization, banks 
have strong incentives to escape regulation’s constraints and to take 
advantage of regulatory lags.  At high levels of liberalizations, those 
incentives are curbed by market discipline.  The evidence presented here 
provides support to this argument.  This result is robust to different model 
specifications and sample sizes.   
The results highlight that the incentives that institutions create can and 
do vary with the passage of time.  This provides an important contribution to 
the literature, given that a substantial amount of research has assumed static 
effects of institutions – and particularly, of regulation - on countries’ 
vulnerability to crises.  These results are also of interest beyond the research 
question motivating this paper and open other venues of study.  Although the 
baseline model presented here is parsimonious in comparison with the 
econometric models present in the literature, its predictive power is 
relatively high.  Its parsimony allows for further testing of other hypotheses 
regarding banking crises onset, providing a good baseline for analysis.  The 
empirical analysis also suggests reevaluating the importance of some 
economic variables assumed to be related to banking crises, but that failed to 
achieve statistically significant relationships with crisis onset in these models. 
These findings open questions for future research.  In particular, do 
regulatory lags have similar effects on other industries, or is this effect 
specific to the banking sector?  Second, and given that prudential supervision 
does not seem to be a robust predictor of banking crisis onset: what kinds of 
prudential rules are more effective at diminishing countries’ vulnerability to 
banking crises?  How does the nature of the supervisory agency affect the 
country’s vulnerability to banking crises?  What characteristics of the financial 
market make regulatory lags more problematic?   
Finally, more research should examine the role of other political variables 
on banking crisis vulnerability.  For example, although partisanship was not a 
significant predictor of banking crisis onset in the tests of this paper, and is 
not part of the theory’s argument, it is possible that the government’s party 
ID has conflicting effects in different countries, depending on the 
government’s credibility, past experience with bailouts, or even its duration 
in office. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1:  Coding of the variable “Banking Sector 
Supervision”   
This appendix is an excerpt of Abiad, Detragiache, and Tressel’ “A New 
Database of Financial Reforms” (Abiad et al. 2010:299-301).  Exclusions and 
minor changes have been made for brevity reasons. 
Banking Sector Supervision 
1) Has a country adopted a capital adequacy ratio based on the Basle standard? 
(0/1) 
0:  the Basle risk-weighted capital adequacy ratio is not implemented. 
Also, prior to 1993, when the Basle regulations were not in place 
internationally 
1:  the Basle CAR is in force. (Note: If the large majority of banks meet 
the prudential requirement of an 8 percent risk-weighted capital 
adequacy ratio, but this is not a mandatory ratio as in Basle, the 
measure is still classified as 1). 
2) Is the banking supervisory agency independent from executives’ influence? 
(0/1/2) 
0:  when the banking supervisory agency does not have an adequate 
legal framework to promptly intervene in banks’ activities; and/or 
when there is the lack of legal framework for the independence of 
the supervisory agency such as the appointment and removal of the 
head of the banking supervisory agency; or the ultimate jurisdiction 
of the banking supervision is under the MOF; or when a frequent 
turnover of the head of the supervisory agency is experienced.  
1:  when the objective supervisory agency is clearly defined and an 
adequate legal framework to resolve banking problems is provided 
(the revocation and the suspension of authorization of banks, 
liquidation of banks, and the removal of banks’ executives etc.) but 
potential problems remain concerning the independence of the 
banking supervisory agency (for example, when the MOF may 
intervene into the banking supervision in such as case that the board 
of the banking supervisory agency board is chaired by the MOF, 
although the fixed term of the board is ensured by law); or although 
clear legal objectives and legal independence are observed, the 
adequate legal framework for resolving problems is not well 
articulated.  
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2:  when a legal framework for the objectives and the resolution of 
troubled banks is set up and if the banking supervisory agency is 
legally independent from the executive branch and actually not 
interfered with by the executive branch.  
3) Does a banking supervisory agency conduct effective supervisions through on-
site and off-site examinations? (0/1/2) 
0:  when a country has no legal framework and practices of on-site and 
off-site examinations is not provided or when no on-site and off-site 
examinations are conducted.  
1:  when the legal framework of on-site and off-site examinations is set 
up and the banking supervision agency have conducted examinations 
but in an ineffective or insufficient manner.  
2: when the banking supervisory agency conducts effective and 
sophisticated examinations. 
4) Does a country’s banking supervisory agency cover all financial institutions 
without exception? (0/1) 
0:  if some kinds of financial institutions are not exclusively supervised 
by the banking supervisory or are excluded from banking supervisory 
agency oversights.  
1:  when all banks are under supervision by supervisory agencies without 
exception.  
 
Enhancement of banking supervision over the banking sector is coded by 
summing up these four dimensions, which are assigned a degree of reform as 
follows. 
 
Highly Regulated = [6], Largely Regulated = [4-5], Less Regulated = [2-3], 
Not Regulated = [0-1] 
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Appendix 2:  Observations included in different samples. 
 
TABLE A1.  OBSERVATIONS INCLUDED IN THE CRISIS ONSET MODELS, EXCLUDING CRISES YEAR 
(MODEL 12) 
 
COUNTRY YEARS CRISIS ONSET 
INCOME 
GROUP 
1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1974-2005 1988 4 
2 DOMINICAN REPUBLIC    1997-2005 2003 3 
3 JAMAICA 1974-1998 1996 3 
4 MEXICO 1979-2005 1981, 1994 3 
5 NICARAGUA 1989-1995 1990 2 
6 COSTA RICA 1974-2005 1987, 1994 3 
7 COLOMBIA 1974-2005 1982, 1998 3 
8 VENEZUELA 1974-2005 1994 3 
9 ECUADOR 1974-1982, 1986, 1990-
1998 
1982, 1998 2 
10 PERU 1974-2005 1983 3 
11 BRAZIL 1974-1987, 1990-2005 1990, 1994 3 
12 PARAGUAY 1989 – 2005 2005 2 
13 ARGENTINA 1981–1993, 1995–1996, 
2001, 2003-2005 
1988, 1995, 
2001 
3 
14 URUGUAY 1982 – 2005 2002 3 
16 POLAND 1992-2005 1992 4 
17 HUNGARY 1991-2005 1991 4 
18 BULGARIA 1995-2005 1996 3 
19 RUSSIAN FEDERATION 1997-2005 1998 3 
20 UKRAINE 1997-2005 1998 2 
21 SWEDEN 1974-2005 1991 4 
22 NORWAY 1974-1986, 1988-1994, 
1996-1998, 2000-2002, 
2004 
1991 4 
23 CAMEROON 1974-1987, 1889, 1991-
1992, 1994-2005 
1987, 1995 2 
24 BURKINA FASO 1989-1991, 1993, 1995-
2000, 2002-2005 
1990 1 
25 GHANA 1974-2005 1982 1 
26 NIGERIA 1974-1986, 1988-1998, 
2000-2005 
1991 2 
27 UGANDA 1984-1999, 2001-2002, 
2004-2005 
1994 1 
28 KENYA 1974-2005 1985, 1992 1 
29 MADAGASCAR 1974-1994, 1996-1997, 
1999-2005 
1988 1 
30 MOROCCO 1974-1989, 1995-2000, 
2002-2005 
1980 2 
31 ALGERIA 1975-1998, 2000-2005 1990 3 
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COUNTRY YEARS CRISIS ONSET 
INCOME 
GROUP 
32 TUNISIA 1974-2005 1991 2 
33 TURKEY 1974-2005 1982, 2000 3 
34 EGYPT 1974-2005 1980 2 
35 JORDAN 1978, 1980-1984, 1987, 
1989-1999, 2002-2005 
1989 2 
36 CHINA 1991-1998, 2001-2005 1998 2 
37 KOREA, REPUBLIC OF 1974-2005 1997 4 
38 INDIA 1974-1975, 1977-2005 1993 2 
39 BANGLADESH 1979-2005 1987 1 
40 SRI LANKA 1974-2005 1989 2 
41 NEPAL 1977, 1979-2005 1988 1 
42 THAILAND 1977-2005 1983, 1997 2 
43 MALAYSIA 1974-1975. 1977-1985, 
1988-2005 
1997 3 
44 PHILIPPINES 1974-2005 1983, 1997 2 
45 INDONESIA 1975-1986, 1988-2005 1997 2 
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TABLE A2.  OBSERVATIONS INCLUDED IN THE CRISIS ONSET MODELS, INCLUDING CRISES YEAR 
 COUNTRY YEARS CRISIS ONSET 
INCOME 
GROUP 
1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1974-2005 1988 4 
2 CANADA    1974-2005  4 
3 DOMINICAN REPUBLIC    1997-2003, 2005 2003 3 
4 JAMAICA 1974-1996 1996 3 
5 MEXICO 1979-2005 1981, 1994 3 
6 GUATEMALA 1974-2005  2 
7 EL SALVADOR 1998-2005  2 
8 NICARAGUA 1989-1995 1990 2 
9 COSTA RICA 1974-2005 1987, 1994 3 
10 COLOMBIA 1974-2005 1982, 1998 3 
11 VENEZUELA 1974-2005 1994 3 
12 ECUADOR 1974-1998 1982, 1998 2 
13 PERU 1974-2005 1983 3 
14 BRAZIL 1974-2005 1990, 1994 3 
15 BOLIVIA 1974-2005  2 
16 PARAGUAY 1995  2 
17 CHILE 1994-2005  3 
18 ARGENTINA 1983-2005 1988, 1995, 2001 3 
19 URUGUAY 1986-2002 2002 3 
20 SWITZERLAND 1997-2005  4 
21 POLAND 1992-2005 1992 4 
22 HUNGARY 1991-2005 1991 4 
23 CZECH REPUBLIC 2001-2005  4 
24 ALBANIA 1996-2005  3 
25 BULGARIA 1995-2005 1996 3 
26 ROMANIA 1996-2005  3 
27 RUSSIAN FEDERATION 1997-2005 1998 3 
28 ESTONIA 1997-2005  4 
29 LATVIA 1997-2005  4 
30 LITUANIA 1997-2005  3 
31 UKRAINE 1997-2005 1998 2 
32 BELARUS 1997-2005  3 
33 GEORGIA 1998-2005  2 
34 AZERBAIJAN 1997-2005  3 
35 SWEDEN 1974-2005  4 
36 NORWAY 1974-2004 1991 4 
37 DENMARK 1974-2005  4 
38 SENEGAL 1974-2005  2 
39 COTE D'IVOIRE 1974-2005  2 
40 BURKINA FASO 1989-2005 1990 1 
41 GHANA 1974-2005 1982 1 
42 CAMEROON 1974-2005 1987, 1995 2 
43 NIGERIA 1974-2005 1991 2 
44 UGANDA 1985-2005 1994 1 
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 COUNTRY YEARS CRISIS ONSET 
INCOME 
GROUP 
45 KENYA 1974-2005 1985, 1992 1 
46 TANZANIA 1993-2005  1 
47 ETHIOPIA 1983-2005  1 
48 MOZAMBIQUE 1995-2005  1 
49 ZIMBAWE 1985-2003 1995 1 
50 SOUTH AFRICA 1974-2005  3 
51 MADAGASCAR 1974-2005 1988 1 
52 MOROCCO 1974-2005 1980 2 
53 ALGERIA 1975-2005 1990 3 
54 TUNISIA 1974-2005 1991 2 
55 TURKEY 1974-2005 1982, 2000 3 
56 EGYPT 1974-2005 1980 2 
57 JORDAN 1978-2005 1989 2 
58 ISRAEL  1983-2003  4 
59 KYRGYSTAN 2000-2005  1 
60 KAZAKHSTAN 1997-2005  3 
61 CHINA 1991-2005 1998 2 
62 KOREA, REPUBLIC OF 1974-2005 1997 4 
63 JAPAN 1974-1995  4 
64 INDIA 1974-2005 1993 2 
65 PAKISTAN 1974-2005  2 
66 BANGLADESH 1979-2005 1987 1 
67 SRI LANKA 1974-2005 1989 2 
68 NEPAL 1977-2005 1988 1 
69 THAILAND 1977-2005 1983, 1997 2 
70 MALAYSIA 1974-2005 1997 3 
71 SINGAPORE 2005  3 
72 PHILIPPINES 1974-2005 1983, 1997 2 
73 INDONESIA 1975-2005 1997 2 
74 AUSTRALIA 1974-2005  4 
75 NEW ZEALAND 1974-2005  4 
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